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VALUATION, VALUES, NORMS: 
PROPOSALS FOR ESTATE AND GIFT  
TAX REFORM 
BRIDGET J. CRAWFORD* 
Abstract: In their contributions to this Symposium, Professor Joseph Dodge, 
Professor Wendy Gerzog, and Professor Kerry Ryan offer concrete proposals 
for improving the existing estate and gift tax system. Professor Dodge and 
Professor Gerzog are especially interested in accuracy in valuation, and ad-
vance specific proposals with respect to split-interest transfers and family lim-
ited partnerships. Professor Dodge makes an additional proposal to improve 
the generation-skipping transfer tax system, an understudied area of the law. 
Professor Gerzog’s Symposium contribution draws particular attention to the 
legal fiction on which the estate and gift tax marital deductions rely. She 
would restrict the availability of the deduction to only meaningful economic 
transfers to a spouse, consistent with a desire that tax results reflect the under-
lying substantive results. Professor Ryan also focuses on the estate and gift tax 
marital deduction, along with other wealth transfer tax benefits available to 
spouses. She imagines an expansion of those rules, showing how easily the 
law can be separated from economic substance. 
INTRODUCTION 
Estate tax is a topic that inspires sharp debate in just about every con-
text. Opponents call it a “death tax,” telling all who will listen that the tax is 
unfair.1 Proponents counter that the estate tax is a reasonable price to pay for 
robust and predictable economic, legal, and social systems.2 Despite these 
divergent views about the structure and philosophical foundations of the ex-
isting system of wealth transfer taxation, both sides agree that the current sys-
                                                                                                                           
 © 2016, Bridget J. Crawford. All rights reserved. 
 * Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law; B.A., Yale University; J.D., University of 
Pennsylvania Law School; Ph.D., Griffith University. For excellent conversations about wealth 
transfer taxation, thanks to Joseph Dodge, Wendy Gerzog, James Repetti, and Kerry Ryan. I grate-
fully acknowledge the role of the American College of Trust and Estate Counsel Foundation, the 
conference organizers, and the student editors of the Boston College Law Review in supporting, 
planning, and executing this Symposium. 
 1 MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE FIGHT OVER 
TAXING INHERITED WEALTH 6–7 (2006). 
 2 WILLIAM H. GATES, SR. & CHUCK COLLINS, WEALTH AND OUR COMMONWEALTH: WHY 
AMERICA SHOULD TAX ACCUMULATED FORTUNES, at xi (2003). 
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tem is flawed.3 Among both critics and proponents of the tax, there appears to 
be a consensus that there are simply too many loopholes that are easily ex-
ploited by well-advised, wealthy individuals. Enter into the reform conversa-
tion Professor Joseph Dodge, Professor Wendy Gerzog, and Professor Kerry 
Ryan. In their contributions to this Symposium, each explores specific prob-
lems with existing wealth transfer tax laws. Professor Dodge’s contribution 
focuses primarily on split-interest gifts, family limited partnerships, and the 
generation-skipping transfer tax. He also flags as areas ripe for reform life 
insurance, Crummey trusts, certain charitable trusts, and Qualified Terminable 
Interest Property (“QTIP”) trusts.4 Professor Gerzog, who shares many of 
Professor Dodge’s concerns about valuation issues, nominally advances six 
specific reform proposals. A close read of her article, though, reveals a wealth 
of ideas for improving the administration of the wealth transfer tax. Professor 
Gerzog focuses reader attention on the testamentary nature of life insurance, 
valuation problems with split-interest transfers, and the economic substance 
of marital deduction transfers. Professor Ryan takes up marital deduction 
transfers and focuses her attention on gift-splitting and estate tax portability. 
She examines how each is consistent or inconsistent with a marital sharing 
approach to wealth transfer tax exemption. 
In considering the specific proposals that Professors Dodge, Gerzog, 
and Ryan advance, their goals are illuminated by the framework in which 
they work. Each (to a certain degree) accepts the existing wealth transfer 
tax system, with notably Professor Dodge being willing to engage in the 
reform project although he believes that an accessions tax would be more 
effective.5 Each author looks at major techniques and fundamental princi-
ples that inform most sophisticated estate plans: transfers with retained in-
terests (Professor Dodge and Professor Gerzog), valuation (Professor 
Dodge and Professor Gerzog), and the marital deduction (Professor Gerzog 
and Professor Ryan). With respect to family limited partnerships in particu-
lar, Professor Dodge and Professor Gerzog do not shy away from a position 
likely to be unpopular with practitioners and clients. They call for the end to 
                                                                                                                           
 3 See, e.g., Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REV. 69, 73–76 (1990) 
(arguing for limitations on ability to transfer wealth); Joel C. Dobris, A Brief for the Abolition of 
All Transfer Taxes, 35 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1215, 1216 (1984) (“In a sentence, the complaint is that 
the tax has lost its bite.”); James R. Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
825, 827 (2001) (“Despite the many flaws in our system, the evidence suggests that the benefits of 
taxing wealth transfers outweigh any associated harms.”).  
 4 Joseph M. Dodge, Three Whacks at Wealth Transfer Tax Reform: Retained-Interest Trans-
fers, Generation-Skipping Trusts, and FLP Valuation Discounts, 57 B.C. L. REV. 999, 1027 n.163 
(2016). 
 5 See Joseph M. Dodge, Replacing the Estate Tax with a Re-Imagined Accessions Tax, 60 
HASTINGS L.J. 997, 1000–09 (2009) (providing reasons to change from an estate tax system to an 
accessions tax system); Dodge, supra note 4, at 999 (noting preference for accessions tax system). 
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all valuation discounts for family limited partnerships, except for those that 
operate actual businesses.6 But it would be wrong to read these Symposium 
contributions as entirely iconoclastic. For example, Professor Gerzog and 
Professor Ryan accept the existence of generous wealth transfer tax deduc-
tions for marital transfers. Professor Gerzog would limit them to transfers of 
actual wealth to a spouse, and Professor Ryan would expand the deductions 
to permit even more deemed transfers. Because each of the three contribu-
tions accept (or at least are willing to work within the framework of) exist-
ing law, the work of Professors Dodge, Gerzog, and Ryan, taken together, 
represents a pragmatic—but not unified—approach to law improvement. 
What unifies the three articles is an interest in the behavior of taxpayers in 
response to complex wealth transfer tax laws. 
I. EFFICIENCY, NON-DISTORTION, AND ACCURACY 
If there were a dream team of lawyers assembled to propose reforms to 
the wealth transfer tax laws, Professor Joseph Dodge would be a first-round 
draft pick. Actually, most of the contributors to this Symposium would be 
first-round draft picks and Joseph Dodge would be the MVP. In Three 
Whacks at Wealth Transfer Tax Reform: Retained-Interest Transfers, Gen-
eration-Skipping Trusts, and FLP Valuation Discounts,7 Professor Dodge 
explains three clusters of desired reforms to existing wealth transfer tax 
laws. He begins his article with a discussion of the two primary goals of 
wealth transfer taxation: to raise revenue and to curb wealth accumula-
tions.8 The law has not achieved these goals especially well since 1980, he 
says, attributing the failure to legislation that has lowered rates and raised 
exemptions and the unwillingness of Congress to close loopholes that are 
far too easy to exploit.9 Two of Professor Dodge’s proposals go to closing 
those loopholes, and will be familiar to readers of his other scholarship.10 
He advocates postponement of taxation on certain split-interest transfers 
until actual transfer to the beneficiary (a proposal complemented by Profes-
sor Gerzog’s Symposium contribution11) and reducing the availability of 
discounts for family limited partnerships. His third proposal, a plan to re-
                                                                                                                           
 6 Dodge, supra note 4, at 1022–35; Wendy C. Gerzog, Toward a Reality-Based Estate Tax, 
57 B.C. L. REV. 1037, 1053–55 (2016). 
 7 Dodge, supra note 4. 
 8 Id. at 1000. 
 9 Id. at 999–1001. 
 10 See, e.g., Joseph M. Dodge, Retained Interest Transfers Under the Estate and Gift Tax, 133 
TAX NOTES 235, 235 (2011) (providing a proposal to simplify the law on retained interest trans-
fers under the estate and gift tax). 
 11 See Gerzog, supra note 6 (offering six proposals to reform the estate and gift tax). 
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form the existing generation-skipping transfer (“GST”) tax rules, is an utter-
ly unique and significant contribution to the reform debate. 
With respect to gratuitous transfers with retained interests, Professor 
Dodge identifies five separate categories of transfers that present particular 
problems under existing law: (1) retained current-enjoyment transfers,12 (2) 
transfers that can be returned to the transferor,13 (3) retained-reversion 
transfers,14 (4) transfers with a retained power to alter, amend, or termi-
nate,15 and (5) employee survivor benefits and survivor annuities.16 With 
respect to retained current-enjoyment transfers and retained-reversion trans-
fers (commonly known as private annuities or self-cancelling installment 
notes), Professor Dodge proposes a hard-to-complete valuation rule: the 
imposition of tax upon the first to occur of the expiration of the retained 
interest or the transferor’s death.17 This more accurately would capture the 
value of the gratuitous transfer and abandon reliance on actuarial tables that 
are flawed because they are generic, fail to take into account actual events, 
and ignore appreciation.18 He would impose a similar rule with respect to 
employee survivor benefits and commercial annuities, fully including them 
in the employee/purchaser’s estate, without regard to the existence of a re-
tained interest.19 Professor Dodge’s rationale is that these transfers are al-
ways gratuitous and valuation is most accurately determined at the time of 
death of the employee/purchaser. 
With respect to revocable transfers, he would treat as incomplete even 
those transfers subject to a revocation power held jointly with an adverse 
party, on the grounds that the remainder beneficiary’s interest is postponed 
whether the grantor retains the sole power or holds it jointly with another 
party.20 Professor Dodge is concerned with the reality of who gets what 
when; only when a transfer has occurred in fact would he seek to impose a 
tax. Thus, in the case of transfers subject to a retained power to alter, 
amend, or terminate, Professor Dodge would assign no economic value to 
the retained power and instead treat the transfer as wholly complete when 
made. Fundamentally, Professor Dodge’s proposal takes the focus off the 
form of a transfer and places it on a determination of who receives what 
economic benefit when. Only on receipt of a real economic benefit would 
he seek to impose a tax on the property’s then-fair market value without 
                                                                                                                           
 12 Dodge, supra note 4, at 1002–09. 
 13 Id. at 1009. 
 14 Id. at 1009–10. 
 15 Id. at 1011. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. at 1005–09. 
 18 Id. at 1003–04. 
 19 Id. at 1011. 
 20 Id. at 1009. 
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resort to estimates or predictions. Professor Dodge wants the tax to reflect 
actual economic values. 
With respect to family limited partnerships, Professor Dodge offers a 
full complement of solutions. One option would be to disregard a closely 
held investment entity such as a family limited partnership and treat, for 
transfer tax purposes, the entity’s owners as the pro rata owners of the un-
derlying assets.21 This would have the practical impact of eliminating mi-
nority interest discounts at the entity level. Although Professor Dodge 
would allow a lack-of-marketability discount with respect to entities that 
operate businesses, he would aggregate spousal interests even with these 
entities, on the theory that spouses are likely to act in concert with each oth-
er. This author is less persuaded than Professor Dodge that destruction of 
value (as opposed to wealth) is against public policy,22 but he does make a 
strong case for disregarding self-imposed restrictions that have no inde-
pendent purpose other than the depression of value for wealth transfer tax 
purposes. The problem, as Professor Dodge sees it, is that the family limited 
partnerships would not exist in most cases but for the wealth transfer tax 
benefits. Thus they have a distortive effect that a well-designed law should 
not tolerate. 
If Congress chooses to leave the existing law unchanged (thus permit-
ting lack-of-marketability and minority interest discounts for investment-
funded family limited partnerships), Professor Dodge would impose a re-
capture tax upon the removal of any previously recognized limitations.23 
Thus the removal, lapse, expiration, or other lifting of a restriction that had 
been imposed by means of a gratuitous transfer and that previously gave 
rise to a discount in value for gift or estate tax purposes would give rise to a 
tax to be paid by those who benefitted from the valuation discount.24 Pro-
fessor Dodge’s rule would apply without regard to how or why any re-
striction is lifted. The strength of his proposal is that it is both principled 
and practical. He anticipates political or practical resistance to substantial 
change, and proposes an elegant recapture tax modeled on other recapture 
provisions in the existing law. 
                                                                                                                           
 21 Id. at 1031–32. 
 22 Id. at 1028 (“The destruction of economic value is, as a general matter, contrary to sound 
public and economic policy. Accordingly, tax rules that encourage the willful destruction of value 
should be eliminated.” (footnotes omitted)). The problem with this logic is that it conflates the con-
cepts of wealth and value. Indeed, absent a restrictive covenant or homeowners’ association agree-
ment, people are free to paint their homes an undesirable, unmarketable, or ugly color, even if doing 
so will depress the home’s value. 
 23 Id. at 1033–35. 
 24 Id. at 1034–35. 
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Professor Dodge has previously critiqued the generation-skipping trans-
fer tax as having a somewhat shaky intellectual foundation.25 In this Sympo-
sium contribution, he brackets those concerns to show that even if one ac-
cepts the need for a generation-skipping transfer tax, the existing system is 
unnecessarily complex. To simplify, Professor Dodge would impose a GST 
tax only on distributions to skip persons, defined as those persons two or 
more generations removed from the transferor.26 Eliminating taxable termina-
tions from the definition of generation-skipping transfers under § 2611 is 
more consistent, he believes, with taxing only actual transfers and not hypo-
thetical ones. This seems like an entirely sound proposal. He would also ex-
clude direct-skip transfers from the definition of a generation-skipping trans-
fer on the grounds that they represent less of a tax avoidance opportunity 
compared to long-term trusts. Wealthy individuals are far less likely to trans-
fer substantial wealth outright to grandchildren than to transfer interests in 
trust.27 Against that backdrop, Professor Dodge makes alternate proposals for 
how such a “transferee-oriented”28 GST tax would operate. A flat forty per-
cent rate would apply to all GST transfers.29 Transfers would “count against” 
the estate and gift tax exemption amount of the deemed transferor (in Profes-
sor Dodge’s first iteration)30 or the distributee himself or herself (in Professor 
Dodge’s second iteration).31 Alternately, the third iteration would impose a 
flat tax on taxable terminations and taxable distributions.32 
Professor Dodge’s proposals take aim at curbing tax-driven behavior, 
although substantial administrative challenges arise with respect to each of 
his alternatives, a critique that Professor Dodge acknowledges.33 Specifical-
ly the proposal to impose a GST tax on deemed transferors, where the 
deemed transferor is always the distributee’s parent who is related to the 
transferor, raises a threshold question of fairness. It may be that the trans-
feree’s parent had no say in the creation of the trust or is estranged from the 
                                                                                                                           
 25 See Joseph M. Dodge, Comparing a Reformed Estate Tax with an Accessions Tax and an 
Income-Inclusion System, and Abandoning the Generation-Skipping Tax, 56 SMU L. REV. 551, 
578–86 (2003) (asserting that existing generation-skipping tax rules are profoundly flawed). 
 26 Dodge, supra note 4, at 1012, 1016. 
 27 See, e.g., Eric Rakowski, Transferring Wealth Liberally, 51 TAX L. REV. 419, 442 n.60 
(1996) (describing use of sophisticated trusts to transfer wealth to grandchildren). 
 28 Dodge, supra note 4, at 1016. 
 29 Id. at 1017. 
 30 Id. at 1017–19. 
 31 Id. at 1019–20. 
 32 Id. at 1020–21. 
 33 Bos. Coll. Law Sch., The Centennial of the Estate and Gift Tax: Perspectives and Recommen-
dations, YOUTUBE (Oct. 2, 2015), https://youtu.be/4xBWvXUWo3g (showing Professor Dodge’s 
response to commentary at the Boston College Law Review Symposium on the centennial of the 
estate and gift tax); see also Dodge, supra note 4, at 1019 (noting the administrative problems associ-
ated with the deemed transferor approach). 
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trust’s grantor. Imposing a tax on a deemed (as opposed to actual) transferor 
raises potential problems. To the extent that the deemed transfer-
or/transferee’s parent has not otherwise used his or her exemption and will 
not do so, the rule change would have no practical impact. The exemption 
would fully absorb any tax and no amount would need to be paid to the 
government. But in a few circumstances, it is possible that some amount 
would be due. Logistically, Professor Dodge’s system would require the 
trustee to inform the deemed transferor of any taxable distribution, the 
deemed transferor would then have to file a gift tax return, and the trustee 
would then withhold from the distribution the appropriate GST tax calculat-
ed at the flat rate.34 Professor Dodge would allow the filing of the gift tax 
return to constitute the distributee’s refund claim, but that requires the 
deemed transferor to disclose the gift tax return to the trustee and/or the dis-
tributee, which raises privacy and logistical considerations. It is unclear 
what recourse a distributee would have in the event that the deemed trans-
feror failed to file, incorrectly filed, or refused to share any gift tax returns. 
For in-kind distributions, Professor Dodge would have the transferee pay 
the GST tax, but it is unclear how the transferee could take proper account 
of the deemed transferor’s unused exemption. And in the case of deceased 
deemed transferors, complications would arise where taxable distribution 
happens in a different year than the deemed transferor’s death, if the notion 
would be to include taxable distributions in the estate of the deemed trans-
feror.35 
With these problems, it is easy to see that an accessions tax—or at 
least an accessions-based approach to GST tax—would be easier to admin-
ister than either the existing system or the proposed treatment of the distrib-
utee’s parent as the deemed transferor. For that reason, Professor Dodge 
proposes an alternate system that would treat the distributee as the taxpayer 
for GST purposes, obviating the need to rely on another person to file tax 
returns or provide information. A distributee clearly knows whether (and 
when) a taxable distribution has occurred and how much prior exemption he 
or she has used. Professor Dodge imagines a rate structure that is either flat 
or graduated,36 although given a high exemption and a desire for simplicity, 
it is not clear that there is a strong argument for a graduated rate system. 
Professor Dodge tends to favor such an accessions-based approach, as 
it is more administratively convenient. It avoids all of the administrative 
problems he identifies with a deemed transferor approach: information 
gathering, a withholding system, and differential treatment for in-kind and 
                                                                                                                           
 34 Dodge, supra note 4, at 1018. 
 35 See id. at 1018–19 (noting the complications involved in accounting for the exemption if 
the taxable distribution occurs in different years). 
 36 Id. at 1019. 
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cash distributions.37 An accessions-like system is also more in keeping with 
the underlying purposes of the wealth transfer tax, such as the dissipation of 
wealth concentrations. Professor Dodge importantly articulates another, typ-
ically unstated, purpose of the GST tax: treating direct transfers the same as 
transfers in trust.38 This is an aspect of the GST that has been under-
theorized, and Professor Dodge’s Symposium contribution certainly will 
inspire future consideration of how to improve an existing system that fails 
to meet its stated and unstated purposes. 
II. THE ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE OF REAL WEALTH TRANSFERS 
Professor Wendy Gerzog is an estate tax realist. She accepts the basic 
premise and structure of the wealth transfer tax laws. Professor Gerzog un-
derstands the political reality that some form of wealth transfer taxation is 
likely to be part of the legal landscape for some years to come. In her Sym-
posium contribution, Toward a Reality Based Estate Tax,39 one does not 
find attenuated arguments about family farms and small businesses,40 dis-
cussion of disincentives to hard work,41 or calculations of the comparatively 
little revenue generated by the wealth transfer tax system.42 Nor does one 
find paeans to the ability of the estate tax to break up concentrations of 
wealth and create a more level playing field.43 In place of these is Professor 
Gerzog’s deep, abiding, and pragmatic interest in a well-functioning and 
fair system. She applies her considerable technical expertise to propose 
wealth transfer tax laws that reflect reality—the underlying economic reali-
ty of what taxpayers do in the face of overly complex rules. Professor Ger-
                                                                                                                           
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. at 1018–19 (“A distributee-oriented tax accords with various rationales of wealth-transfer 
and GST taxes: (1) to curb undue accumulations of inherited (and, therefore, unearned) wealth, (2) to 
encourage the dispersion of wealth, (3) to reduce the appeal of long-term dynastic trusts, and (4) to 
achieve after-tax outcome equity between direct and successive-interest transfers.” (footnotes omit-
ted)). 
 39 Gerzog, supra note 6. 
 40 Cf. William W. Beach, Time to Repeal Federal Death Taxes: The Nightmare of the American 
Dream, HERITAGE FOUND. (Apr. 4, 2001), http://www.heritage.org/Research/Taxes/BG1428ES.cfm 
[https://perma.cc/Y6E2-CK93] (claiming that in an uncertain estate tax climate “[s]mall-business 
owners, particularly minority owners, suffer anxious moments wondering whether the business they 
hope to hand down to their children will be destroyed by the death tax bill”). 
 41 Cf. Edward J. McCaffery, The Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation, 104 YALE L.J. 
283, 359 (1994) (“It is too simplistic to say that the estate tax has no disincentive effects on those 
who pay it.”). 
 42 Cf. Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 YALE L.J. 259, 279 
(1983) (asserting that the estate tax brings in only a small amount of revenue and has little effect 
on savings and investment). 
 43 Cf. McCaffery, supra note 41, at 294 (“The actual gift and estate tax regime, however, 
encourages frequent, large, inter vivos gifts, systematically excluded from the income tax base, 
and it thus can dramatically undermine the pursuit of equal opportunity and level playing fields.”). 
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zog invites attention to various legal fictions that that allow taxpayers to 
postpone, minimize, or avoid tax liability altogether. She makes a convinc-
ing case for why these fictions should not be tolerated, as they have a dis-
tortive effect on behavior, causing taxpayers to engage in transactions that 
have little or no independent significance apart from their tax consequences. 
In her quest for a more “real” system, Gerzog makes six specific pro-
posals: (1) limit the income tax exclusion for life insurance proceeds,44 (2) 
include in a decedent’s gross estate certain split-interest transfers where the 
transferee does not receive full and adequate consideration in money or 
money’s worth for the full fair market value of the underlying fee interest in 
the property,45 (3) eliminate the use of actuarial tables in valuing certain 
split-interest transfers,46 (4) eliminate most valuation discounts for family 
limited partnerships and limited liability companies,47 (5) repeal the QTIP 
provisions, and (6) disallow a deduction for most split-interest charitable 
transfers.48 
Professor Gerzog’s proposal to include life insurance in a decedent’s 
gross estate is a bold one. The crux of her proposal is a return to the legal 
regime in effect between 1942 and 1954: where the decedent either paid the 
premiums or had incidents of ownership over a life insurance policy, the 
gross estate included the proceeds under § 2042.49 Professor Gerzog would 
be willing to accept as second-best an amended § 2035 that would include 
life insurance proceeds in the decedent’s gross estate to the extent the dece-
dent has paid insurance premiums within three years of death.50 Practically 
speaking, adopting such a rule would have devastating consequences for the 
life insurance industry. Individuals would no longer have any tax incentive 
to purchase many insurance policies. Instead of the estate planning “sure 
thing” that much insurance currently is (that is, as long as the appropriate 
procedures are followed, any sized death benefit will be excluded from the 
decedent’s gross estate), life insurance would become instead just that—a 
matter of betting on the death of the insured. That bet either would or would 
not turn out to be a good investment, depending on whether, taking into ac-
count the time value of money and if the insurance remains in effect at the 
decedent’s date of death, the total premiums paid compare favorably to the 
death benefit. If Professor Gerzog’s proposed rule were adopted, many 
standard estate plans (i.e., for those individuals who own any or substantial 
                                                                                                                           
 44 Gerzog, supra note 39, at 1038–44. 
 45 Id. at 1044–49. 
 46 Id. at 1050–53. 
 47 Id. at 1054–56. 
 48 Id. at 1056–60. 
 49 Id. at 1039–43. 
 50 Id. at 1042. 
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life insurance) would have no need for irrevocable life insurance trusts 
(“ILITs”). The surrounding administrative costs associated with sending 
annual Crummey notices and the like would disappear automatically. 
Professor Gerzog’s life insurance proposal is grounded in her charac-
terization of life insurance as inherently testamentary. She writes:  
In an ILIT, the trust holds a life insurance policy on decedent’s 
life, proceeds are paid to beneficiaries of the trust irrevocably 
named by the decedent, and the proceeds are paid to the ILIT at 
the decedent’s death. As a result, the ILIT is clearly a testamen-
tary device and the value of the proceeds should be includable in 
the decedent’s estate.51  
In other words, a testamentary transfer occurs when post-death benefits are 
paid to beneficiaries selected by the decedent. But if this were the core of 
Professor Gerzog’s objection, then one could imagine a rule that pulled 
back into the decedent’s gross estate all of the insurance premiums trans-
ferred during lifetime, not just transfers within three years of death, as in 
Professor Gerzog’s second-best alternative. In other words, bring back into 
the decedent’s estate the estate-depleting transfers that are transformed into 
tax-free gifts at death under existing law. 
Professor Gerzog’s real objection to life insurance may run deeper than 
the fact that it involves death-time transfers to a decedent’s beneficiaries. 
More concerning to her is what she calls the “valuation freezing” aspect of 
life insurance.52 She refers to the legislative history of the 1981 amend-
ments to § 2035 and Congress’s decision to retain the rule including in the 
decedent’s estate transfers within three years of death of life insurance poli-
cies or any incident of ownership with respect to a life insurance policy.53 
What troubled Congress then and what underlies Professor Gerzog’s 
proposal is not just the fact that a decedent’s selected beneficiaries receive 
post-mortem benefits, but rather that they receive so many benefits. In other 
words, the insurance death benefit far exceeds the amounts paid in premi-
ums. Perhaps, though, this objection is best understood without recourse to 
the language of estate freezes—which accurately describes techniques like 
grantor-retained annuity trusts (“GRATs”) in which taxpayers take strategic 
advantage of valuation rules to fix the value of a particular asset at the low-
est transfer tax value possible, even when actual asset performances “beat” 
the valuation tables and greater wealth can transferred to the beneficiaries at 
the lower value. Estate planning with life insurance by definition never in-
                                                                                                                           
 51 Id. at 1043. 
 52 Id. at 1040. 
 53 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE ECONOMIC 
RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981, at 262 (Comm. Print 1981). 
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volves a decedent’s transfer of an asset that he or she owns for less than its 
fair market value. Rather, life insurance involves a promise by the insurance 
company to pay death benefits to the policy owner’s beneficiaries if all 
premiums are paid and other policy terms are followed. Life insurance is a 
commercially sanctioned bet. Because the vast majority of life insurance 
policies lapse during lifetime,54 the payment of an insurance premium is not 
like an irrevocable transfer of, say, a remainder interest in a trust. It is far 
from obvious that all or even most insurance premium payments result in a 
transfer to anyone other than the insurance company. 
None of this is to say that Professor Gerzog’s proposal lacks coher-
ence. Rather, it is an attempt to articulate the principles of fairness that are 
violated by the existing estate tax laws that allow most life insurance bene-
fits to escape taxation. Professor Gerzog’s proposal is helpful because it 
focuses attention on how the market for life insurance would differ if policy 
proceeds were includable in a decedent’s gross estate. If the current market 
would not exist (or would not exist in its robust current form) but for the 
estate tax benefits, then current rules have a distortive effect and should be 
reformed. Outside of the estate tax system, a similar result to the one Pro-
fessor Gerzog proposes could be accomplished through a revision to the 
income tax rules. This alternative has purchase if one is unconvinced by the 
estate freeze rationale for the inclusion of life insurance in a decedent’s 
gross estate, or if one seeks a simple fix through the repeal of § 101, caus-
ing income tax inclusion for life insurance beneficiaries. 
After her discussion of life insurance, Professor Gerzog shifts her fo-
cus to the marital deduction and QTIP trusts. Professor Gerzog has been 
working for over twenty years on building practitioner and academic 
awareness of the abusive nature of these trusts.55 In this Symposium contri-
bution, Professor Gerzog proposes the repeal of the QTIP and reverse-QTIP 
                                                                                                                           
 54 Jilian Mincer, 10 Things Life Insurers Won’t Tell You, MARKETWATCH (June 19, 2011 
8:08 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/10-things-life-insurers-wont-tell-you-1308333194735 
[https://perma.cc/XW5K-G7UY]. As one commentator noted: 
One in every 14 of customers with term life-insurance policies stop paying the pre-
miums each year, according to life insurance industry group Limra. For those with 
permanent policies, which may have a cash value long before the death of the in-
sured, some 25% of policyholders stop making premium payments within the first 
three years of owning the policies; within 10 years, 40% have let the policies lapse. 
Id. 
 55 See Wendy C. Gerzog, The Illogical and Sexist QTIP Provisions: I Just Can’t Say It Ain’t 
So, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1597, 1597 (1998) (asserting that “the QTIP provisions are degrading to 
women, sexist, and financially unrewarding to widows”); Wendy C. Gerzog, The Marital Deduc-
tion QTIP Provisions: Illogical and Degrading to Women, 5 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 301, 326–27 
(1995) (explaining how the QTIP demeans women and advocating for the repeal of the QTIP 
provisions). 
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rules that allow a full marital deduction for assets that do not pass in any 
meaningful economic sense to a surviving spouse.56 In another article,57 
Professor Gerzog sets forth her detailed proposal to limit the marital deduc-
tion to either outright transfers or what she calls a “super-charged” power of 
appointment trust (“PAT”) where the surviving spouse has an annual income 
interest in the trust and the ability to determine who ultimately receives the 
trust property.58 To Professor Gerzog, the power of appointment trust has 
the advantage of being a truly marital transfer: via the income interest, the 
trust property benefits only the surviving spouse during his or her continued 
lifetime; and via the appointive power over the trust corpus, the surviving 
spouse has the same ability to dispose of the trust property as with property 
owned outright. 
This author shares Professor Gerzog’s intuition that such a “super-
charged” PAT” is close enough to an outright transfer that it merits qualifi-
cation for the marital deduction. Yet it is worthwhile to pose a more basic 
question: why is it that any transfer in trust should qualify for the marital 
deduction? One’s answer to that question likely will depend on whether one 
views trusts as fundamentally infantilizing or uniquely protective of wealth. 
To those who treat trusts as an indication of a stated or unstated assessment 
by the grantor that the beneficiary is not fit to manage assets himself or her-
self, objections to the super-charged PAT would remain. But for those who 
view trusts as an effort by the grantor to make sure that assets will be avail-
able for the beneficiary—notwithstanding any spendthrift habits or creditor 
problems that the beneficiary might have—then the eligibility of the power 
of appointment trust for the marital deduction makes abundant sense. 
With respect to split-interest transfers, Professor Gerzog proposes a 
valuation-upon-receipt rule for split-interest transfers in trust such as 
GRATs and charitable lead trusts. The problem, as Professor Gerzog points 
out, is that the tables upon which wealth transfer tax values are based are 
inaccurate.59 Although it would be possible to tweak the tables to be some-
what more accurate under the existing economic climate, as Professor Ger-
zog points out, any valuation table would remain subject to manipulation.60 
Therefore her proposed rule of waiting until property passes into possession 
of (or into continued trust for the benefit of) the successor interest brings 
certainty in valuation. Administratively, Professor Gerzog would make it 
the responsibility of the trustee to pay the transfer tax at the highest appli-
                                                                                                                           
 56 Gerzog, supra note 6, at 1057–58. 
 57 Wendy C. Gerzog, The New Super-Charged PAT (Power of Appointment Trust), 48 HOUS. 
L. REV. 507 (2011). 
 58 Id. at 535. 
 59 Gerzog, supra note 6, at 1050–51, 1060. 
 60 Id. at 1050–51. 
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cable rate before any distribution to or for the benefit of the successor bene-
ficiaries.61 With respect to split-interest charitable transfers, such a rule is 
preferable to an absolute repeal of the charitable lead annuity trust provi-
sions, as there are some taxpayers who create such trusts with genuine phil-
anthropic motives and, to the extent that assets actually pass to charity, that 
reality should be taken into account. After all, if one is concerned, as Pro-
fessor Gerzog is, about realness in application of the wealth transfer tax 
rules, one’s rules should take into account the reality of assets actually 
transferred to charity. 
Stepping back from any specific proposal she makes, one might ask 
how loss of revenue factors into Professor Gerzog’s concerns. No doubt, her 
revenue concerns are measurable and well researched. Professor Gerzog 
cites to an estimated $42 billion in lost tax revenue in 2009 on account of 
marital deduction transfers alone.62 Several of her proposals likely would 
generate additional revenue, especially the valuation-upon-succession rules. 
But one suspects that just as Professor Gerzog seeks realness from the tax 
rules, she is realistic herself about the wealth transfer tax laws’ limited abil-
ity to generate revenue, especially given the relatively high estate tax ex-
emption.63 Rather, she brings into sharp focus the loopholes and incentives 
under current law that cause taxpayers to engage in transactions that they 
otherwise would not undertake in the absence of the law. 
III. FAIR STRUCTURES, FAMILIES, AND FICTION 
Professor Kerry Ryan’s Symposium contribution considers the estate 
and gift tax marital deduction and other marital tax benefits. From an estate 
and gift tax perspective, marriage is the best planning technique available. 
The U.S. Supreme Court decisions United States v. Windsor,64 in 2013, and 
Obergefell v. Hodges,65 in 2015, allow same-sex couples to be treated for 
tax purposes the same as their opposite-sex counterparts. Spouses—same-
sex and opposite-sex—may transfer assets to each other tax-free during life-
time and at death.66 Practically speaking, this is accomplished by means of 
intricate marital deduction rules,67 rules permitting spouses to split gifts for 
                                                                                                                           
 61 Id. at 1053, 1060. 
 62 Id. at 1056 n.98. 
 63 The estate tax applies to roughly only 0.12% of the population. Dodge, supra note 4, at 
1000 n.7. 
 64 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 65 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 66 This assumes that both members of the couple are citizens of the United States. Different 
rules apply with respect to transfers to non-U.S. spouses. See I.R.C. § 2056(d) (2012) (disallow-
ance of estate tax marital deduction where surviving spouse not U.S. citizen); I.R.C. § 2523(i) 
(2012) (disallowance of gift tax marital deduction where spouse is not U.S. citizen). 
 67 See I.R.C. § 2056 (estate tax marital deduction); I.R.C. § 2523 (gift tax marital deduction). 
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gift tax purposes,68 and the portability rules, which were temporarily enact-
ed in 2010 and made permanent with the enactment of the American Tax-
payer Relief Act of 2012.69 All of these rules are grounded in a theoretical 
approach that, to a certain extent, and arguably in a profoundly flawed way, 
treats spouses as one economic unit for wealth transfer tax purposes. 
In her article Marital Sharing of Transfer Tax Exemptions, Professor 
Ryan explores the legislative history and operation of these rules. She ex-
plains the evolution of the estate and gift tax marital deduction from fifty 
percent of the decedent’s gross estate in 1948 to an unlimited exemption in 
1981.70 Gift-splitting entered the law at the same time as the fifty percent 
marital deduction and thus should be understood as “akin to the marital de-
duction method of accessing a spouse’s effective exemption amount,”71 in-
sofar as operation of § 2513 treats a split gift as if half had been first trans-
ferred by one spouse to the other, and then by the second spouse to the ulti-
mate recipient. Professor Ryan understands estate tax portability as being 
fundamentally different from both the estate and gift tax marital deduction 
and gift-splitting. This is because portability puts taxpayers in a better posi-
tion than they would have been had they done no planning. In other words, 
the surviving spouse can make full use of the deceased spouse’s unused ex-
emption, even if at the time of the first decedent’s death, the value of the 
couple’s combined estates do not “need” each spouse’s exemption to 
achieve a zero tax liability. 
All of this sets the stage for Professor Ryan’s proposal that she calls a 
“positive account” of marital wealth transfers.72 By this she means that 
spouses should have the ability to share their marital exemptions in any 
proportions. In such a system, spouses could gift-split in any percentage (as 
opposed to fifty-fifty, as under current law)73 and share during lifetime or at 
death their unused exemption amounts in any proportion (as opposed to the 
entire amount of the decedent’s unused exemption amount, as under current 
law).74 Most notably, this would permit a surviving spouse to allow the first 
spouse to die to use some of the survivor’s exemption or allow the first de-
cedent’s exemption to carry forward to the surviving spouse (as opposed to 
limiting the sharing in one direction, i.e., from the decedent spouse to the 
surviving spouse). Advantages of Professor Ryan’s proposal, as she articu-
                                                                                                                           
 68 See I.R.C. § 2513 (2012) (gift by husband or wife to third party). 
 69 See American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, § 101, 126 Stat. 2313, 
2314–18 (2013). 
 70 Kerry A. Ryan, Marital Sharing of Transfer Tax Exemptions, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1061, 1063–
64 (2016). 
 71 Id. at 1070–71. 
 72 Id. at 1071. 
 73 Id. at 1071–72. 
 74 Id. at 1073. 
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lates them, include a reduction in purely tax-motivated transfers between 
spouses75 and possible enhancement of bargaining position of the less-
moneyed spouse in any marital negotiations.76 Disadvantages, which Pro-
fessor Ryan acknowledges, include increased complexity77 and increased 
reliance on tax professionals.78 
At the outset of her article, Professor Ryan claims that she takes “no 
normative view” on the appropriateness of provisions of the wealth transfer 
tax laws that accord benefits to married individuals.79 By this, one can take 
Professor Ryan to mean that she believes that she perceives a congressional 
intent to move toward more robust marital sharing of wealth transfer tax 
exemptions. She explains how such a system might work.80 Her article is 
especially helpful for its careful attention to the legislative history of the 
enactment of the marital deduction, gift-splitting, and portability provisions. 
But one should approach with some skepticism the claim that the article has 
no normative content. After all, to provide a detailed discussion of the oper-
ation of a legal regime in which spouses would share all of their wealth 
transfer tax exemptions is to implicitly affirm the place of the marital unit at 
the core of the tax system. The typical justifications for such a position are 
that the income tax laws already treat married couples as one via the joint 
income tax return, and that marital couples form a single economic unit.81 
These rationales remain unchallenged in Professor Ryan’s “positive ac-
count.”82 
Commentators with diverse political affiliations and academic bents 
have vigorously criticized the joint return.83 Among other objections, they 
explain how the return creates economic disincentives for secondary in-
come earners.84 Commentators also have critiqued the economic unity ra-
                                                                                                                           
 75 Id. at 1077. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. at 1076. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. at 1061 n.1. 
 80 Id. at 1076–77. 
 81 Id. at 1073–74 (quoting TRACY BLAKE DEVLIEGERI & TIFFANY B. CARMONA, REAL PROP., 
TR. & ESTATE LAW SECTION, AM. BAR ASS’N, THE RULES OF PORTABILITY 2 (2011), http://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/rpte_ereport/2011/Dec_2011/te_articles.authche
ckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/32LM-MAXY]). 
 82 See Ryan, supra note 70, at 1071–76 (proposing a new framework for marital sharing of 
transfer tax exemptions). 
 83 Anthony C. Infanti, Decentralizing Family: An Inclusive Proposal for Individual Tax Fil-
ing in the United States, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 605, 606–07; Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Saving Seaborn: 
Ownership Not Marriage as the Basis of Family Taxation, 86 IND. L.J. 1459, 1459–60 (2011).  
 84 See, e.g., Grace Blumberg, Sexism in the Code: A Comparative Study of Income Taxation of 
Working Wives and Mothers, 21 BUFF. L. REV. 49, 88–95 (1971) (examining whether unfavorable 
taxation creates disincentives for working wives to continue to work); Infanti, supra note 83, at 
616–17 (discussing whether joint filings provide disincentives for work by secondary earners); 
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tionale for granting certain privileges to married couples, explaining that the 
benefit is both too broad (insofar as spouses who live entirely or mostly in-
dependent economic lives are eligible for the benefits) and too narrow (in-
sofar as unmarried individuals who do lead economically interdependent 
lives are ineligible for the benefits).85 For that reason, some commentators 
favor individual returns and no exemptions for marital wealth transfers.86 
Consider what principles or values might underlie a proposal to further 
complicate the marital wealth transfer tax exemptions. Because the tax val-
ue of a person’s estate and gift tax exemption amount is readily quantifia-
ble, it is possible that making exemptions freely transferrable between 
spouses might give the “poorer” spouse a potential bargaining tool or quasi-
property right in any marital negotiations.87 If the “poorer” spouse has suf-
ficiently few assets as to not “need” his or her individual exemption, the 
poorer spouse should be willing to transfer it to the richer spouse, and the 
richer spouse should be willing to pay some amount up to one dollar less 
than the taxes the richer spouse’s estate would face in the absence of access 
to the poorer spouse’s exemption. With respect to gift-splitting, the pro-
posed benefit of the “positive account” is less clear, as it is not obvious 
whether it has any applicability to annual exclusion gifts, which, anecdotal-
ly, are a large percentage of the gifts that are split. In other words, if the 
wealthy spouse makes a gift to a third party of twice the annual exclusion 
amount, there is no financial reason that the “poorer” spouse should decline 
to split the gift at a 50-50 level, even if the “poorer” spouse has a taxable 
estate that will benefit from full use of the poorer spouse’s applicable ex-
emption. A fifty-fifty split of a gift equal to twice the annual exclusion 
                                                                                                                           
Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS: Family, Income-Sharing, and the Joint In-
come Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 63, 109–10 (1993) (asserting that separate taxation would not 
provide a disincentive for second earners to work); Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Fami-
ly: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REV. 983, 989–96, 1014–
29 (1993) (illustrating by example how tax incentives affect the decision to operate as a one or 
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 85 See Bridget J. Crawford, One Flesh, Two Taxpayers: A New Approach to Marriage and 
Wealth Transfer Taxation, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 757, 792–94 (2004) (describing how the economic 
unit rationale is under-inclusive); see also Pamela B. Gann, Abandoning Marital Status as a Fac-
tor in Allocating Income Tax Burdens, 59 TEX. L. REV. 1, 31 (1980) (noting that the joint return 
fails to account for the differences in how people share income); Kornhauser, supra note 84, at 96 
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 86 Crawford, supra note 85, at 784–95 (explaining why marital wealth transfers should be 
taxed); Infanti, supra note 83, at 614–18. 
 87 See Ryan, supra note 70, at 1077 (noting how enactment of an elective marital exemption 
may provide bargaining power to the poorer spouse during any marital negotiations). 
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amount “costs” the surviving spouse nothing in a tax sense.88 It does not 
count against the poorer spouse’s applicable exemption. 
In one sense, allowing each spouse to decide whether and in what pro-
portions to gift-split and share the exemptions between them is consistent 
with a respect for autonomy and individual decision-making. Each spouse 
would be able to decide whether, when, and in what proportion to share the 
tax benefits. Yet any such autonomy is necessarily limited; it is a limited 
autonomy to bargain only with one’s spouse, not others in the marketplace. 
A truly autonomous approach would allow each taxpayer to freely transfer 
his or her applicable exclusion to anyone at all, without regard to the exist-
ence of a marital relationship. Such an ultra-autonomous approach to wealth 
transfer tax exemptions likely would not cause the development of a robust 
marketplace in tradable tax credits, such as low-income housing credits,89 
however, because there would be much more supply than demand. But an 
intermediate approach, such as allowing the transfer of one’s wealth transfer 
tax exemption to a limited universe of people, preferably not defined by 
reference to family ties, might allow a more moderate marketplace to de-
velop.90 Doing so also would be consistent with an interest in deemphasiz-
ing the marital unit as a system for channeling governmental benefits or 
support.91 
Although perhaps more consistent with an autonomy principle, a freely 
transferable, or even transferrable-within-a-small-group approach to wealth 
transfer tax exemptions would represent a revenue loss to the government. 
Current gift-splitting and portability rules limit the benefit to spouses. That 
is because one can view the current law as rules of convenience; the current 
law allows spouses to accomplish via elections that which they could ac-
complish via tax-free transfers by one spouse to another. In other words, 
Spouse A is permitted to gift-split with Spouse B, treating the transfer as if it 
had been made one-half by each, because Spouse A could have transferred 
                                                                                                                           
 88 See I.R.C. § 2503(b)(1) (2012) (codifying certain exclusions from gift tax). Revenue Pro-
cedure 2015-53 provides that for the calendar year 2016, “the first $14,000 of gifts to any person 
(other than gifts of future interests in property) are not included in the total amount of taxable gifts 
under § 2503 made during that year.” Rev. Proc. 2015-53, 2015-44 I.R.B. 615. 
 89 I.R.C. § 42(b) (2012); see Clinton G. Wallace, The Case for Tradable Tax Credits, 8 
N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 227, 237–47 (2011) (providing examples of tradeable tax credits). 
 90 This author has argued elsewhere that definitions of family for purposes of § 2032A and 
§ 6166 are outdated. See Bridget J. Crawford, The Profits and Penalties of Kinship: Conflicting 
Meanings of Family in Estate Tax Law, 3 PITT. TAX REV. 1, 58 (2004) (noting that “[§] 2032A’s 
and § 6166’s reliance on family-based tests seems especially inappropriate given the changing 
nature of the American family”); see also Infanti, supra note 83, at 614–18 (critiquing the family-
based organization of income tax laws). 
 91 See, e.g., Laura A. Rosenbury, Federal Visions of Private Family Support, 67 VAND. L. 
REV. 1835, 1860–65 (2014) (asserting that the legal recognition of family is intended to encourage 
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half of the property to Spouse B without incurring a gift tax (by virtue of the 
unlimited marital deduction). Spouse B then could have transferred that 
property to the ultimate beneficiary. Gift-splitting thus allows Spouse A to 
skip the step of actually transferring the property to Spouse B, and the gov-
ernment is no worse off, because it would not have collected any tax reve-
nue on the transfer between spouses anyway. 
But the same would not be true in a regime that allowed gift-splitting 
between, say, Spouse A and her sibling, Sister. In that case, if Spouse A 
makes a gift of $100,000 to a third party, and gift-splitting permitted the gift 
to be treated as if Sister had transferred $50,000 of that to the third party, 
the law would have to indulge the fiction of a transfer from Spouse A to Sis-
ter. A transfer of $50,000 from Spouse A to Sister would be taxable in ex-
cess of the annual exclusion amount. Indulging the fiction would permit 
$36,000 (using the 2016 annual exclusion) to escape taxation, then. That is 
a fiction with real financial consequences and not likely one the law would 
tolerate. Because a truly autonomous approach to wealth transfer tax ex-
emptions as quasi-property interests represents a revenue loss for govern-
ment, it is fiscally and politically unrealistic that the law would move in that 
direction. 
CONCLUSION 
If the estate tax is unpopular in many circles, so is academic scholar-
ship. New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof disparages academic cul-
ture generally as a “culture that glorifies arcane unintelligibility by disdain-
ing impact and audience.”92 Legal scholarship takes a particular beating 
from prominent judges. Judge Dennis G. Jacobs of the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit has bragged of not having read a law review 
“in years,” saying, “No one speaks of them. No one relies on them.”93 Later 
Chief Justice Roberts of the U.S. Supreme Court piled on, saying,  
Pick up a copy of any law review that you see and the first article 
is likely to be, you know, the influence of Immanuel Kant on evi-
dentiary approaches in 18th-century Bulgaria, or something, 
which I’m sure was of great interest to the academic that wrote it, 
but isn’t of much help to the bar.94 
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The claim, in short, is that academics are out of touch, bellowing into a gi-
ant echo chamber. This author suspects, but cannot prove, that none of Mr. 
Kristof, Judge Jacobs, or Justice Roberts reads much tax scholarship. If they 
did, they would know that the academic literature in taxation tends to be 
highly relevant to what lawyers, policy makers, and tax judges do and think 
about on a daily basis. In their contributions to this Symposium, Professor 
Joseph Dodge, Professor Wendy Gerzog, and Professor Kerry Ryan write in 
the tradition of the best tax scholarship: the work is technically expert, rele-
vant to the legislative and regulatory regime that taxpayers face daily, fo-
cused on solutions, and deeply engaged in understanding how well the law 
meets its goals. This work deserves a wide audience. 
In an interview published in the Journal of Legal Education, Judge 
Harry T. Edwards articulated his vision for relevant legal scholarship: it 
must “balance abstract scholarship with scholarly works that are of interest 
and use to lawyers, legislators, judges, and regulators who serve society 
through legal arguments, decision-making, regulatory initiatives, and en-
forcement actions.”95 He probably would appreciate a copy of this issue of 
the Boston College Law Review. 
                                                                                                                           
 95 Ronald K.L. Collins, On Legal Scholarship: Questions for Judge Harry T. Edwards, 65 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 637, 645 (2015). 
  
 
 
